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EXTRA-PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AS A GROUND FOR THE
DISBARMENT OF AN ATTORNEY IN PENNSYLVANIA
In discussing the misconduct of an attorney as a ground for his disbarment
or suspension, this writing excludes from consideration all acts which involve a
breach of the professional duty of an attorney to his client, or of his professional
obligation of respect and good faith toward the courts. The scope of this note
is confined to that misconduct in the personal life, or, if you will, "extraprofessional" life, which may be urged as a ground for disciplinary action.
As an attorney is an officer of the court, the Courts of Common Pleas
of the several counties of Pennsylvania have jurisdiction in disbarment or
suspension proceedings. The courts may act on their own motion, upon the request of the local bar association, or upon the request of any individual. All
disciplinary proceedings are subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth.'
May the court properly consider extra-professional misconduct in disciplining an attorney? Dickins' Case,' which was the first Pennsylvania case to consider the question, answered in the negative. Although the attorney was
temporarily removed from practice for professional misconduct, the court refused to consider, as an additional ground for action, the attorney's holding
of a bogus gift drawing to increase attendance at a theatrical exhibition in
which he was financially interested. There the court said, "However unprofessional the conduct of Mr. Dickins was in relation to the exhibition, and we
think it indefensible, his conduct . . . ought not to be the subject of expulsion
from his office as attorney." a While this dicta of Dickins' Case found expression
in many cases as late as 1921, 4 it was apparently ignored in subsequent county
cases where, prior to disbarment proceedings, there had been a formal indictment, trial, and conviction for such misconduct in a criminal proceeding.' But
the retreat from the original position did not stop here. In Re Wolfe's Disbarment' held that a pardon to the required conviction would not be a bar to disciplinary action because, while a pardon does wipe out a conviction and all of
its punitive consequences, it does not wipe out the act which was committed or
deprive the court of the right to protect itself and the public from irresponsible

IPA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1663 and 1664 (1879).
267 Pa. 169 (1870).
3 Id. at 176.
4 In Brown's Case, 50 Pa. County Ct. 261 (1921), there was dicta to the effect that even
though the conduct of an attorney was inexcusable, it would not be a ground for disbarment as
it was not misconduct connected with the profession.
5 Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa. 220 (1880).
6288 Pa. 331, 135 At. 732 (1927).
[ 268]

1958.]

NOTES

and morally oblique persons. The court, by dictum in the same case, announced
that acquittal of criminal charges would also not be a bar to disciplinary action.
This dictum seems justified because disbarment proceedings are civil and not
criminal in nature, and therefore, evidence may be insufficient to carry the
burden of proof in a criminal action but may still be sufficient to meet the different burden required in a civil case. Although this dictum on acquittal seems
to be indirectly abrogating the necessity of a criminal conviction, it was not
until the case of In Re Chernoff7 that any court directly extinguished this as a
requirement. There the court reasoned:
. . . If a lawyer not actually retained by and representing a client, had corrupted jurors or suborned witnesses in a case on trial at the suggestion of the
counsel therein, it could not be determined that he was not subject to disbarment until after trial by a jury and conviction. If such were the law, the
attorney trying the case who had suggested or connived the corruption could be
summarily dealt with, while the one who had actually accomplished it, could not
be until after he had been tried by a jury . ."88..
While non-criminal professional misconduct is clearly sufficient ground
for disciplinary action, it appears that non-criminal extra-professional misconduct is not. In fact, a review of all cases on extra-professional misconduct in
Pennsylvania fails to reveal a case where this basis of disbarment was even
seriously considered. The writer can offer no justification for this position but
can only state that this is the current status of the law. It seems clear, however,
that extra-professional misconduct of a criminal nature may properly be considered even though there has been no indictment, trial, or conviction. If
criminal proceedings are instituted, neither pardon nor acquittal will be a
bar to subsequent civil action.
Having thus ascertained under just what circumstances the court will
consider extra-professional misconduct, the next question logically concerns the
standard by which such misconduct is measured. The courts will naturally
look to see if the legislature has established such a standard. However, early
legislative efforts apply only to professional misconduct.' The most recent
and only other legislation on the subject is found in the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure. 10 Rule 205 provides: "The Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association, as from time to time existing, shall be and become stand7 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942).
BlM. at 532, 26 A.2d at 338.
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1661 (1834) provides: "If any attorney-at-law shall misbehave
.and id. § 1662 states: "If any such attorney shall retain
himself in his office as attorney....
money belonging to his client. .
10 Adopted pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 61 (1937).
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ards of conduct for attorneys of the court.... ." The effect of the provision
that the rules have the force and effect of statutes makes the canons statutory
rules for the conduct of attorneys." Unfortunately, however, the canons are
confined to professional conduct and offer no aid in formulating a standard of
extra-professional conduct." Consequently, any existing standards must stem
from a crystalization of judicial precedent.
What then is the standard, if any, as evidenced 'by these decisions?
In the case of In Re Griffin,'" an attorney was disbarred who had previously,
in a criminal case, been convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States
Government in the issuance of passports while acting as a United States Commissioner. The court based the disbarment on the following: "It appears to
us that he has throughout displayed such a lack of moral perception as to demonstrate his unfitness for the practice of law. . ,, 11
0 the embezzlement
In Allen's Disbarment"
of funds by an attorney acting
in the capacity of an executor was found to be grounds for disbarment. The
standard there was ". . . lack of personal honesty and moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence." "

The court in Wolfe's Disbarment "6held that the receiving of stolen goods
by an attorney, while acting as a pawnbroker, justified disbarment. This result
was based on the finding by the court that " . . the attorney was no longer to
be trusted."
When confronted with the situation that an attorney, in his capacity as a
detective in the coroner's office, had extorted money and solicited bribes, a
court ordered disbarment on the ground that, "Disbarment is for the purpose
of preserving the courts from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice in them." The order was affirmed by the Supreme Court."°
11 Philadelphia County had previously adopted the canons of ethics by Philadelphia Rule 215
(1) effective January 11, 1933, and Lackawanna County by Lackawanna Rule 18, effective February
20, 1935. It would be beyond the scope of this writing to consider the power of these two courts
to adopt these canons.
12 Schofield Discipline Case, 362 Pa. 201, 66 A.2d 675 (1949).
13 It thus appears that as the American Bar Association may add to, delete from and otherwise
change the canons, the Law of Pennsylvania changes accordingly. The conclusion that the American
Bar Association is making Pennsylvania Law is inescapable. It is also of note that the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civic Procedure purport to set forth only rules of procedure. The adoption of the canons
seems to be the adoption of substantive rules.
14 371 Pa. 646, 92 A.2d 889 (1952); The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a per curiam
decision, affirmed the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas #7 of Philadelphia County.
15 Id. at 652, 92 A.2d at 891.
1641 Pa. County Ct. 562 (1914).
17 Id. at 563.
18288 Pa. 331, 135 At. 732 (1927).
19 Id. at 334, 135 At. at 733.
2
0 In Re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 534; 26 A.2d 335, 339 (1942).
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Where an attorney, acting as a trustee, caused the loss of trust property
through mismanagement, a court in ordering disbarment found that the attorney
had exhibited a ". .. lack of professional honesty as to make him unworthy of
public confidence."
Political beliefs were the grounds considered in Margolis' Case.2" An attorney was disbarred who had been convicted for a violation of the Selective Service
Act. He also was shown to have circulated material in an attempt to get
others to violate the same act and had avowed himself a "theoretical anarchist." There the court stated: "The record before us discloses not only an
utter lack of respect for the duly enacted statutes of the land but active encouragement of others to violate them, as well as breaches thereof by appellant
himself, all of which warrants the action taken by the court." 2"
Although the court did not set any standard of conduct, there is dicta in
the case of In Re Trumbore "2that fornication is not an offense that would
justify disbarment. This position has not been challenged as there have since
been no disciplinary proceedings based on fornication.
In Maginnis' Case, 5 the court held that although it was an impropriety
for a district attorney to sit with counsel for the accused while visiting in another
county, since he took no part in the trial, it did not warrant disbarment because
it did not show the attorney to be "corrupt . . . or controlled by evil purposes.
The publication of a political cartoon by a district attorney, lampooning a
judge who was running for re-election, was the alleged ground for disbarment
in Snyder's Case."7 In refusing disbarment the court said, "Criticism by an attorney of candidates for public office . . .is privileged as far as it is made on
reasonable grounds and in good faith." 21
These decisions seem to indicate that the courts do not recognize any
stated standard of conduct but base their decisions on the exercise of judicial discretion. As would be expected, the discretion exercised by the judges does not
conform to any clearly discernible standard but varies from court to court as
do the judges' individual personalities. Many areas of the law are successfully
15 York Leg. Rec. 77, 80 (1901).
269 Pa. 206, 112 At. 478 (1921).
Id. at 212, 112 At. at 480.
2 Penny. 84 (Pa. 1882).
25 269 Pa. 186, 112 At. 555 (1921).
21
22
22
24

261d. at 198, 112 At. at 559.
2T 301 Pa. 276, 152 Atl. 33 (1930); The cartoon showed the judge's father controlling the
judge by the use of strings. Animosity had developed between the judge and the district attorney
over whether certain county commissioners would be brought to trial for malfeasance in office.
28 Id. at 287, 152 At. at 36.
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administered by using judicial discretion as a basis for decision, the most noteworthy of which is the area of evidence. However, it is submitted that judicial
discretion is not adequate in the area of extra-professional conduct.
This inadequacy is highlighted by decisions currently arising outside Pennsylvania concerning income tax evasion. A recent Washington decision held
that wilful evasion of income tax involved "moral turpitude" and justified disbarment."9 Kentucky, in a case involving an identical fact situation, held eixactly the opposite."0 The Kentucky case must also be compared with a Maryland
case which ordered the disbarment of an attorney convicted of "slugging"
parking meters.3" Clearly these state courts also seem to be at odds over just
what extra-professional misconduct is sufficient to merit disbarment.
All attorneys strive to be paragons of virtue, but to err is only human. It
is inevitable then that disbarment actions will arise. As the decisions in these
proceedings affect entire legal careers, legislation is needed that will establish
a clear standard for judicial application.
It is therefore suggested that the Committee on Ethics of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association either recommend to the American Bar Association that canons
of ethics to cover extra-professional conduct be adopted or recommend to the
Pennsylvania legislature that specific legislative action be taken to establish a
definite standard.
CARL R. MAPEL, JR.
29

In Re Seijas, 318 P.2d 961 (1957).

30 Kentucky State Bar Association v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d 899 (1957).
31 Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).

